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One of the most important and one of the most heavily studied ethnic networks in the world is overseas
Chinese. However, almost all of the analysis on the economic dimensions of the overseas Chinese
network has been about the effects of ethnic ties on the aggregate volume of trade or the effects of
ethnic ties on foreign direct investment (FDI) at the country level. In this paper, we add to the large
and important collection of literature on the subject by studying the profitability of foreign direct investments
made by overseas Chinese in China. Our paper takes advantage of a large dataset—over 50,000 firms
over a period of eight years—that is comprised of two types of foreign firms with investments in China—those
owned by ethnic Chinese and those owned by non-ethnic Chinese. Against common perceptions, we
find that ethnically Chinese firms in China do not outperform non-ethnically Chinese firms by a set
of conventional profitability measures. We also find that the performance of ethnically Chinese firms
deteriorates over time. One hypothesis explaining this result is that ethnically Chinese firms tend to
under-invest in those firm attributes that may enhance long-term performance, such as human capital
and technology (proxied by intangible assets in our paper). Indeed we do find evidence that ethnically
Chinese firms invest far less in intangible assets and human capital as compared with non-ethnically
Chinese firms of similar size, age, and other characteristics. In addition, within strata of matched firms
based on their intangible assets and human capital, ethnically Chinese firms no longer display significant
dynamic disadvantage relative to non-ethnic firms after controlling for other firm characteristics and
fixed effects.
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1.  Introduction 
Economists and other social scientists have studied extensively the economic effects of the 
so-called “co-ethnic networks”—individuals and businesses linked by common ethnic ties. One of 
the most important and one of the most heavily studied ethnic networks in the world is overseas 
Chinese. In this paper, we add to the large and important collection of literature on the subject by 
studying the profitability of overseas Chinese firms, which have invested and maintained operations 
in China. So far almost all of the analysis on the economic dimensions of the overseas Chinese 
network has been about the effects of ethnic ties on the aggregate volume of trade or the effects of 
ethnic ties on foreign direct investment (FDI) at the country level. While these studies have revealed 
some important insights, we argue that a focus on the trade and FDI volumes at the country level 
misses some of the important dynamics about the effects of ethnicity on firms and their 
performance.  In particular almost all the existing works do not explicitly study the ethnic effects 
across different ethnic networks. The most common approach is to compare trade and investment 
volumes within the same ethnic network but between countries with different degrees of ethnic ties.  
Our paper takes advantage of a large dataset—over 50,000 firms over a period of eight 
years—that is comprised of two types of foreign firms with investments in China: those owned by 
ethnic Chinese and those owned by non-ethnic Chinese. Our paper thus explicitly compares 
performance across ethnic and non-ethnic Chinese networks.  This level of empirical disaggregation   4
allows us to explore some deeper dynamics of the Chinese ethnic network. Compared with country-
level studies, this disaggregated approach has the additional advantage of eliminating the effects of 
the macroeconomic environment, the economic policies, and the legal institutions that may 
confound with the impacts of ethnic ties and firm performance.  
For the purpose of this paper, we define overseas Chinese investors as originating from 
three ethnically Chinese economies (ECEs)—Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT).
 While this 
definition does not cover the entire universe of overseas Chinese investors, the coverage of 
investors is sufficiently encompassing. One factor to consider is that investments from other regions 
with a large overseas Chinese community are fairly small compared with investments from HMT. 
For example, the five countries of ASEAN, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, have the largest population of overseas Chinese in the world. In 1997, the year at the 
beginning of our dataset, these five ASEAN countries invested US$3.4 billion in China compared 
with US$24.3 billion invested by the three HMT ECEs in the same year. (In the rest of this paper, 
unless otherwise noted, we will use ECEs to denote Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan only.) 
The three ECEs have been the largest source of FDI in China. Between 1978 and 1999, 
ECEs supplied 59 percent of the entire stock of FDI. Not only is the absolute volume of ECE FDI 
large, ECE investments are present across a wide range of industries and geographic regions in 
China. According to one detailed study of the patterns of FDI in China, ECE investments are 
present in more Chinese industries and are more important to China’s export production than 
similar ECE investments historically in Taiwan (Huang 2003). Thus, apart from the theoretical 
objective of demonstrating the ethnic effects on firm profitability, it is an empirically important   5
subject to explore the sources and the variances of firm profitability in accordance with their ethnic 
ties.  
Against common business perceptions that ECE firms should perform better than non-ECE 
firms in China, we do not find much empirical evidence in support of an ethnic-advantage 
hypothesis. In fact, in our baseline regressions, we sometimes find that ECE firms in China weakly 
underperformed non-ECE firms after controlling for a large number of firm characteristics. Such 
performance differences, it should be noted, are not always robust or statistically significant. We also 
find evidence that while ECE firms hold some initial operating advantage over non-ECE firms, this 
advantage quickly deteriorates over time.  
There are a number of potential explanations for our findings. One possibility is that ECE 
firms are less motivated by profit considerations as compared with non-ECE firms when investing 
in China. For example, they may favor investment locations based on cultural proximity rather than 
based on commercial promise. They may recruit relatives into the workforce rather than those based 
on skills and capabilities. This “hometown effect” for ethnically Chinese investors is noted to 
concentrate mostly in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Our empirical findings are robust when we 
analyze the subsamples of Guangdong and Fujian firms and of the rest of the provinces. We are also 
able to show that the ethnic advantage of ECEs deteriorates most rapidly among those firms 
characterized as technologically-intensive or knowledge-intensive. Such a pattern is significant both 
statistically and economically, and robust to various specification checks. This suggests that the 
dynamic inefficiency of ECE is not explained by either the policy preference toward the ECEs or 
the altruistic investment motivation of the ECEs.   6
This finding is suggestive—although by no means conclusive—of the possibility that ECE 
firms may have under-invested in technology or human capital, those attributes will give the firm a 
longer-lasting operating advantage.
 1 Indeed after controlling for a variety of firm characteristics, we 
found strong evidence that ECE firms do lag non-ECE firms in terms of investments in intangibles 
and human capital. Once the levels of investments in intangibles and human capital are matched 
between ECE firms and non-ECE firms, the ECE firms’ dynamic disadvantage dissipates. There are 
other differences between ECE and non-ECE firms that may bear upon our findings. For example, 
ECE and non-ECE firms may differ in their propensities to engage in earnings management and 
transfer pricing. To the extent allowed by our data, we have designed our empirical strategy in order 
to minimize the influences from these sources.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the existing literature 
and theoretical framework that guide our empirical exploration. Section 2 introduces this unique 
dataset of over 50,000 foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) over a period of four years, giving a 
maximum number of observations of 200,000.  Section 3 presents the model and the empirical 
results. In the fourth section, we present results from a battery of robustness tests (some discussed 
in the appendix to the paper). In our robustness tests we pay particular attention to the possibility 
that our findings are affected by transfer-pricing dynamics allegedly common among ECE firms. We 
carried out exhaustive tests and did not find transfer pricing to be a culprit of our major findings. 
The fifth section concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1 Due to data limitations, we may not be able to rule out other explanations that might also be 
consistent with the empirical results.    7
2.  Literature and Theoretical Framework 
Does ethnicity pay? Specifically, do ethnically overseas Chinese firms outperform non-
ethnically Chinese firms on conventional measures of business performance? In this section, we first 
discuss the theoretical frameworks that guide our empirical exploration. Our paper is related to two 
strands of academic literature.
  One strand of literature focuses on the specific economic and 
business effects and functions of what is known in the literature as “pre-existing relationships,” 
including, although not limited to, ethnic ties. These effects or functions refer to the trust 
enhancement, information provisions, matching of buyers with sellers, and the acquisition or 
diffusions of new knowledge. The outcome of interest in this strand of literature is very similar to 
ours—performance of firms or of individuals. The second strand of the literature deals with what 
might be called “institutional” functions of ethnic ties. Those functions proximate those performed 
by a government and they have to do with contract enforcements and dispute resolutions. These 
institutional functions of ethnic ties arise in environments normally absent of well-developed legal 
institutions. While our paper is very close to this strand of literature in terms of our empirical 
interest, as already noted, this strand of literature focuses on economic phenomena of fairly 
aggregate nature (FDI and trade flows). Our paper is a synthesis of these two strands of economics 
literatures.   
Economists have studied and demonstrated the informational functions of pre-existing 
relationships on financial transactions. For example, Burch, Nanda, and Warther (2005) find that a 
pre-existing underwriting relationship for repeat issuers of new securities leads to a lower fee. To 
single out the informational benefits of a pre-existing relationship, they show this effect to be true   8
only of common stock offers that are particularly prone to asymmetric information problems. 
Schenone (2004) shows that banking relationships with underwriters established before a firm’s IPO 
ameliorate the asymmetric information problems associated with high IPO underpricing. This 
ameliorative effect is significant. A pre-IPO banking relationship with a prospective underwriter 
faced about 17 percent lower under-pricing than firms without such a pre-existing banking 
relationship. Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri (2008) show that banks use venture capital investments to 
build lending relationships. Having a prior relationship with a company in the venture capital market 
increases the chances that a bank will subsequently grant a loan to that company. Companies can 
benefit from these relationships through more favorable loan pricing.
2 
Closer to the empirical focus of our paper is the research by economists who have studied 
the effects of ethnic and regional ties on business and financial transactions. Another similarity is 
that this body of research typically deals with situations in which formal legal institutions are 
relatively under-developed. For example, common ethnic ties have been found to facilitate trade 
credit extensions in developing countries (Fisman and Love 2003 ) as well as the more productive 
forms of financial transactions, such as the use of longer-term contracts over arm’s-length 
contracts—checks rather than cash (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004). Ethnic networks are also 
found to facilitate flows and diffusions of “complex knowledge” (such as science), not just 
                                                 
2 More generally, financial economists have studied the impact of social networks on economic activities 
through knowledge acquisition and diffusion. A number of papers, such as Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2007), Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008), and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), show that 
stock-market participation is influenced by social interactions, that households’ and even professional money managers’ 
portfolio-choice decisions seem to be substantially influenced by word-of-mouth communications with peers, and that 
social networks may be important mechanisms for information flows into asset prices.   9
transaction-specific information.   Kerr (2005) concludes that ethnic scientific communities play an 
important role in international technology diffusion. Kalnins and Chung (2006) provide evidence 
from the U.S. lodging industry that Gujarati immigrant entrepreneurs benefit from their ethnic 
group’s social capital when already-successful members are co-located in the same industry.   
The informational asymmetry is a particularly acute problem when it comes to transactions 
across different geographic and political boundaries. For this reason, international trade economists 
have studied how ethnic ties may affect international trade and capital flows.
3  Ethnic networks 
consisting of immigrants and overseas residents serve to match the foreign/domestic buyers with 
domestic/foreign sellers. Therefore, ethnicity pays in the sense that ethnic members understand the 
characteristics of both home and foreign market characteristics better than non-ethnic members. 
The matching function of the co-ethnic ties is at the heart of a theoretical model developed by 
Casella and Rauch (2002). Rauch and Trindade (2002) developed a test for this informational 
function of co-ethnic networks. They found that the Chinese ethnic network exerted a particularly 
strong effect on trade in the differentiated product space. Because differentiated products do not 
have a ready reference price point, trading is particularly intensive in its information requirements. 
And the fact that the ethnic effects are particularly large in this product space is evidence of the 
informational advantage of ethnic ties. Tong (2005) extended this framework to FDI and showed 
that the ethnic effects were still present in developed countries with well-developed institutions. She 
thus drew the conclusion that the information functions of ethnic ties—as opposed to contract 
enforcement—were more important.  
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive literature review, see Rauch (2001).    10
The second strand of the literature deals with what might be called the “institutional” 
functions of a relationship. These functions, covering contract enforcement and dispute resolution, 
proximate those performed by a government. The institutional functions of a relationship arise in 
environments that are normally lacking in well-developed legal institutions, and it has been argued 
that they can serve as a substitute for the formal legal institutions
4. For example, Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales (2004) exploit social capital differences within Italy. They find that in high-social-
capital areas, households are more likely to use checks, to invest more in stock and less in cash, to 
have greater access to institutional credit, and to make less use of informal credit. The effect of 
social capital is stronger among less-educated people and where legal enforcement is weaker. Allen, 
Qian, and Qian (2005) observe that financing channels and corporate governance mechanisms based 
on reputation and relationships are an important alternative to a formal legal and financial system in 
supporting the growth of the private sector in China.  
The works of Grief (1989; 1993) are the most explicit efforts to model the institutional 
functions of ethnic ties. According to him, ethnic ties sustain trade agency relationships through a 
collective punishment mechanism. In his model, although information shortage plagued the long-
distance trade during the medieval era, it did not cripple the agency arrangement. This is because 
Maghribi traders relied on a collective punishment mechanism that excluded an opportunistic agent 
from future dealings with all the members of the trading network. The crucial ingredient in this story 
is the ethnic homogeneity of the Maghribi traders. Grief provides documentary evidence that 
                                                 
4 There is also a vast literature on how legal origins and legal institutional in general affects economic 
activities and growth. See, for example, the survey paper by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
The literatures on the impacts of formal and informal institutional arrangements complement each other.   11
Maghribi traders, who had the most developed form of this mechanism, thrived more than other 
traders.  
While many studies stress the positive effects of ethnic ties in facilitating trade and 
investment flows, we should point out that a number of studies have sounded a more cautionary 
note—that ethnic ties can actually be inefficient in certain circumstances. We will briefly summarize 
this literature here and argue that the ambiguous predictions from this literature review suggest a 
need to resolve the issue empirically.  
A key feature of co-ethnic network is the idea of privilege—insider knowledge and 
preferential information enjoyed by the members of the network to the exclusion of the non-
members (Casella and Rauch 2002). To draw empirical implications of ethnic ties we need to 
consider explicitly both the inclusive nature as well as the exclusive nature of co-ethnic ties.  
There are two ways to think about this issue. One is the possibility that the gains accruing to 
the members of the network are achieved at the expense of the non-members. In their model, 
Casella and Rauch (2002) theorize that transacting through ethnic networks entails distributional 
implications. Anonymous and formal markets remain under-developed when a large share of 
economic transactions occurs among related agents of a network. The specific mechanism in their 
model is human capital allocation. Casella and Rauch call it “a lemon effect:” Ethnic groups tie up a 
disproportionate share of productive human capital, leaving the rest of the society with less 
productive members.
5 
                                                 
5 Casella and Rauch use this reasoning to explain why the mainstream society may bear grudges 
against ethnic minorities.    12
The above reasoning raises questions about the economy-wide implications of ethnic ties but 
there are also firm-level and efficiency implications. It is theoretically possible that ethnic ties can 
lead to less optimal outcomes for the members of the network as well. This implication is hinted at 
by Casella and Rauch, although their model did not explicitly explore this possibility. A quote from 
their paper is highly suggestive: “Li Ka-shing calls the boys before he calls the brokers.” While 
Casella and Rauch are mainly concerned about the exclusionary effects on the brokers in their model, 
another plausible scenario is that Li Ka-shing—one of the most prominent businessmen in Hong 
Kong—was ill advised by “the boys”—the friends and relatives related to Li Ka-shing but who do 
not have objectively sound business expertise. Here the effect of the network is the exclusion of 
capable human capital. This theorizing about the ethnic networks is consistent with the criticisms 
that economists have on family firms (Bertrand et al. 2002, Bae et al. 2002, Chang 2003, Coff 1999, 
and Baek et al. 2006), especially in emerging economies (La Porta et al. 2000).  
Some economists, while demonstrating the positive contributions toward information 
provision, nevertheless argue that ethnic networks can lead to dynamic inefficiencies. Grief (1994) 
argues that there is an efficiency loss with the mechanism adopted by Maghribi traders to curb 
opportunism. The ethnic networks have an inward bias in that it is cheaper for insiders to trade than 
for outsiders. So theoretically there is a potential for the ethnic networks to divert trade as opposed 
to creating trade. The efficiency loss due to a tightly knit network has long been recognized by non-
economists. In a famous paper, Granovetter (1973), a sociologist, shows that loose networks are 
more efficient in generating useful information on job search as compared with tight networks. The 
reason is that tight networks are less likely to generate truly new and useful information. Although   13
Granovetter does not focus on ethnic networks per se, one can argue that ethnic networks are 
among the tightest networks in the world and therefore would suffer from the liabilities in his 
framework. 
We will turn to empirical analysis later in the paper to examine whether common ethnic ties 
promote or reduce firm profitability in the Chinese context. It should be noted here that field 
research, however, has uncovered substantial evidence that overseas Chinese businesses have often 
recruited heavily from their ancestral hometowns and immediate families, thus limiting themselves 
to a narrow base of human capital. These businesses retain their related managers and workers even 
if they are unproductive in an objective sense because this is viewed as “an obligation” to their home 
regions (Smart and Smart 1993). If this effect is pervasive enough, ethnically Chinese firms may earn 
lower returns on their invested capital because they are matched with trustworthy but incompetent 
human capital.   
Field research also uncovers evidence that ECE firms tend to invest in a limited set of 
geographic locations. They have invested heavily in their own home regions with an explicit purpose 
of benefiting the local economies and the local residents.
6  One way to think about their investment 
projects is that they are a form of donation to their ancestral villages.  These “altruistic” investment 
motivations, while perfectly aligned with the utility functions of the overseas Chinese investors, may 
not show up as profitable projects by the conventional benchmarks. To demonstrate these 
                                                 
6 Evidence uncovered by Ezra Vogel in his research on Guangdong province shows that many of the Hong 
Kong firms return to do business in their ancestral home regions. Half of the export-processing contracts in the 
Dongguan region of Guangdong were with former Dongguan residents now living in Hong Kong (Vogel 1989 , p. 176).   14
phenomena as systematic or pervasive beyond these anecdotal accounts requires an empirical 
demonstration on the basis of a large-scale dataset, a task to which we turn next.  
 
3.  FDI Data and Measures  
As noted before, we define overseas Chinese investors as those originating in three ECEs—
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.
 7  This definition of ECEs follows conventional classification used 
in the official Chinese statistical survey, which constitutes our data source. Unfortunately, the dataset 
does not contain additional information about the exact source of the FDI.  For example, we do not 
know whether an ECE investment is from Hong Kong or from Macao. Between 1978 and 1999, the 
ECEs supplied 59 percent of the entire stock of FDI in China. Not only is the absolute volume of 
ECE FDI large, ECE investments are present across a wide range of industries and geographic 
regions in China. We are fully aware of the various imperfections in our classification of ethnic FDI 
due to the limitation of our data. For example, China also receives FDI investments from other 
regions with a large overseas Chinese community, although the volumes of such FDI are fairly small 
compared with investments from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Chinese immigrants in Europe, 
America and Japan could potentially be behind the FDI investments from those regions into China.  
In addition, we could not completely rule out the possibility that a portion of FDI 
originating from Hong Kong, Macro and Taiwan could potentially contain an element of truly non-
                                                 
7 Politically, China takes over sovereign rights to Hong Kong and Macao in 1997 and 1999, respectively. 
However, economically, these regions still enjoy almost complete independency. International agencies such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund routinely classify these regions as separate economic identities from 
mainland China, and calculate FDI and trade volume accordingly.   15
ethnical investments. These three ECEs, especially Hong Kong, can be used by multinational 
corporations as legal domiciles. That said, we are confident that the majority of FDI from Hong 
Kong, Macro and Taiwan comprises investments made by ethnic Chinese firms and entrepreneurs. 
In addition, to the extent that our classification of ethnic and non-ethnic FDI is imperfect, this bias 
should work against us finding any significant differences in the performance of ethnic and non-
ethnic FDI. 
The informational function of ethnic ties leads to a straightforward prediction that ECE 
firms should outperform non-ECE firms. If the ethnic ties lead to a better matching of capabilities 
and knowledge between ethnically Chinese foreign investors and Chinese investors, then ethnic 
businesses should command an operating premium compared with those firms outside the network. 
One feature that our dataset lends readily to is an empirical test based on this logic. Of the total 
population of FIEs, in the dataset, approximately 58,089 are joint ventures. We single out joint 
ventures for emphasis because joint ventures require ongoing communication and co-management 
between foreign and Chinese investors. If the ECE joint ventures are better matched than non-ECE 
joint ventures, we should expect to see higher operating margins.  
 
3. 1. Study Design and Data  
To test the null hypothesis that ECE-originating FDI does not outperform non-ECE FDI in 
China, one would ideally conduct a randomized experiment for these two types of FDI in China.  In 
this experiment, the treatment would consist of FDI by ethnically Chinese overseas investors; 
particularly those based in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and would randomly be assigned to   16
companies in China.  The remaining companies would take on FDI by other foreign investors. The 
experimenter would then follow up on these two groups of companies over time and compare the 
mean performance of the companies in the two groups after a few years post-FDI entry.   Similar to 
most economic research questions, we can at best approach this with observational studies instead 
of randomized experiments. We managed to procure very comprehensive data—the Chinese 
Industry Census (CIC) for the years 1998 to 2005—compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) in China. To our knowledge, the CIC is the most detailed database on Chinese industrial 
firms and it is well suited for exploring ethnic variance in performance.    
The dataset contains detailed financial data for each of the entire population of the FDI 
firms in China with sales in excess of 5 million yuan (roughly US$600,000) for each of the census 
years between 1998 and 2005. The detailed company information and panel structure allow us to 
properly handle the potential endogeneity of FDI by origin. To give an example, certain industries 
are more productive and may attract more ECE investors because they possess more innate 
knowledge about these industries.  This correlation between the productivity of the industry to 
which a company belongs and whether the company adopts ECE FDI could cause an upward bias 
in the coefficient estimate of the ECE-FDI treatment variable. We mitigate this potential bias by 
controlling for the industry dynamics at a very disaggregated level. The industry codes in the CIC are 
at the four-digit level, detailed to the level of product groupings, such as “leather shoes” as opposed 
to “shoes.” The panel structure helps eliminate any time-invariant firm-specific effects and the study 
of a large number of firms and sectors makes our results generalizable.   17
Similarly, whether a company receives ECE FDI or not might also be endogenous to the 
company’s own productivity. The best we can do then is to control for crucial company 
characteristics, such as the number of years since incorporation, size, leverage, and labor-
intensiveness, in the regression models. In particular, these variables help capture the observed and 
correlated latent company experience and productivity advantages or disadvantages. In the set of 
benchmark regression models with only four key variables and industry and province dummies, 
there is enough flexibility to add non-linear terms of the key covariates to overcome the limitations 
of the OLS linear assumptions.  We are re-assured that the main findings of our paper are robust to 
these considerations.  
 
3.2. Data Description and Selection of the Variables 
Source and Nature of the Data 
The dataset contains detailed information about each company’s identity, address, industry 
classification, incorporation year, employment, hierarchical level to which the company answers 
(regional, provincial, town-level, etc.), registration type (ECE, domestic, foreign, joint venture, or 
joint cooperative), three main products in the order of relative importance, and production 
capacities for these three products, respectively. The dataset also includes the assets, both the year-
end level and the change within the year, ownership rights, contractual and actual investments, sales, 
profits, and exports and imports. In addition, there are detailed records of the breakdown of 
contractual and actual equity capital among the investment sources, such as investments from   18
domestic firms, ECE investors, and other foreign investors. Each company’s intangible assets, total 
capital, capital depreciations, and new outputs are also recorded. 
The Chinese standard of industrial classification (CSIC), modified in 1988, was adapted from 
the International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC).  The CSIC in our dataset is at the four-
digit level.  For instance, the automobile industry is further classified into the truck, van, car, mini-
van, special automobile, automobile body, and automobile part and equipment manufacturing 
industries. Such a detailed industrial classification allows us to control for technology and other 
dynamics at the near product level.  This level of control is critical in our exercise. Industry 
classifications at the customary two-digit level are often too broad and unable to capture the intra-
industry characteristics of the technology.  Our empirical implementation minimizes both the inter-
industry and intra-industry differences in technology and other characteristics, as well as the 
correlations between these characteristics and the ethnic characteristics of the investors.  
That said, we note a number of caveats with our dataset. Though the industrial censuses 
were carefully conducted, the dataset contains some errors. We checked and corrected such errors as 
best as we could. For instance, some industry codes contain less than four digits, often times 
because the first zero number is omitted. These are apparently reporting errors, and we looked up 
these companies’ main products, which are reported in the dataset, in the industrial classification 
codebooks, and we filled in the industry codes to which these products should belong.  Similarly, 
some of the province codes are mistyped or missing, and we corrected them by referencing the 
address of the companies and the codebook.  Although we tried our best to clean the data and 
ensure that the different variables yield consistent information, there may be remaining   19
inconsistencies that we were not able to detect. In addition, we also performed robustness analyses 
within each industry, as reported in the Appendix. 
Measures of Performance 
Given our primary focus on testing whether foreign direct investments from different ethnic 
origins (in particular ECEs versus non-ECEs) have different consequences on a firm’s performance, 
the key is to select appropriate performance measures and control covariates that are appropriate for 
our sample. Since the majority of the observations in our database are non-listed firms, we do not 
have information about the market value of equity or assets and we cannot rely on stock market-
based performance measures. We focus instead on standard operating performance measures to 
study whether ECE FDI outperforms non-ECE FDI: return on assets (Desai, Foley, and Hines 
2004a , Joh 2003), return on equity (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004b , Nissim and Ziv 2001), and net 
margins (Joh 2003, Lambkin 1988, Lu and Beamish 2001). Intuitively, these are the total profits 
normalized by total assets, total equity ownership rights, and total sales, respectively. To be specific, 
we define Return on Assets as profits divided by beginning-of-year assets. Since we do not have the 
beginning-of-year assets directly, we compute them as the end-of-year assets minus the profits 
(which we implicitly assume to accrue as assets for the next year). We define Return on Equity as the 
ratio between profits and ownership rights, and we define net margin as the ratio between profits 
and sales.  
To account for the possibility that managers might engage in earnings management to hide 
the true performance of their firms, and that ECE firms and non-ECE firms might engage in 
different levels of earnings management activities, we further adjusted our performance measures to   20
account for the fact that they might be subject to earnings management.
8  We report the empirical 
results using these adjusted measures of firm performance. In unreported tests, we confirm that the 
results are qualitatively similar when we use the unadjusted measures of performance.  
Furthermore, due to the fact that the distributions of ratio variables are conducive to 
outliers, we winsorized the data at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. Such winsorizing is 
increasingly used in the empirical finance and accounting literature, such as in Brav and Lehavy 
(2003) and Durnev and Kim (2005). 
 
Control Variables 
Following the literature, we included a company’s total assets, leverage, and age as the main 
control variables, together with the set of firm, industry, and province dummy controls.  The value 
of total assets is mainly used to control for the company’s size. We plotted the histograms of these 
variables and generated a log term of the total assets variable so that the distribution of the log 
variable better approximates a normal distribution and better suits the linear regression assumptions. 
Given that China is abundant in labor resources and capital resources are comparatively scarce, we 
additionally controlled for the labor-intensiveness of the firm in the regression model. We measured 
labor-intensiveness by capital-paid-in divided by the number of workers. This can be a useful control 
if ECE and non-ECE firms differ in terms of the labor intensity of their production.  
                                                 
8 To be specific, we followed Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) to calculate the discretionary accrual of a 
firm, and we adjusted the earnings numbers accordingly. These adjusted earnings numbers might be substantially 
different from the unadjusted numbers, and the deviations do not necessarily cancel out over time for the same firm. 
The detailed procedure for adjusting for discretionary accrual may be obtained from the authors.   21
We calculated a company’s leverage by subtracting the equity ownership rights from the end-
of-year assets and dividing this difference by the end-of-year assets.
9  The age of a company is 
defined as the number of years it has been in operation up to the survey year (e.g., 1998) minus the 
incorporation year. This variable helps to capture the variations in production and management 
experiences and potential differences in the life-cycle stages of firms that can be a crucial 
determinant of performance. The long survival of a company in the market can also act as a 
selection control for productive companies. One particular dynamic that this variable controls for is 
the so-called “first-mover advantage.” To the extent that ECE investors entered China earlier than 
other investors, there might be a potential correlation between ECE ethnicity and first-mover 
advantage. In our empirical implementation, as we will detail later, the company age effect is 
independent of the ECE effect.   
Although not included in the benchmark model, we have compiled an exhaustive list of 
other covariates to better control for the potential confounding effects on performance.  The 
standard measure of size is the size of total assets, but because we include total assets in calculating 
the ROA, we also tried the alternative measure for the size of companies as given in the CIC. The 
CIC divides all the firms into large, medium, and small categories. Our findings are robust to control 
for this alternative measure of firm size. The influence a foreign investor exerts on management 
decisions is usually proportional to the fraction of equity held by the foreign investor. We have a 
measure of foreign ownership given by the percentage fraction of foreign equity—whether ECE or 
                                                 
9 Essentially, we try to measure Debt/Total_Asset by (Total_Asset – Equity)/Total_Asset. 
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non-ECE—of total equity.   In many studies, exports are used as a proxy measure of firm-level 
productivity (Qian 2007). We use export values as a share of total sales to control for the company-
specific productivity level. An additional benefit is that this may also address transfer-pricing 
concerns.  
Transfer pricing may affect performance of FDI firms and the differentials between ECE 
and non-ECE FDI firms. By its covert nature, transfer pricing is intrinsically hard to detect and 
measure, but some researchers have used the values of foreign trade as a proxy for the transfer-
pricing dynamics (Desai et. al. 2004). We follow the same procedure here.  For this purpose, we 
generated two variables: the difference in exports and imports as a fraction of total output, and the 
ratio of exports to total sales. (As an additional test, we performed similar procedures on a separate 
dataset comprising all FDI firms in 1995. The results are qualitatively similar to those generated 
from the CIC.)
10 We generated a dummy variable, POLHCHY, which is the position of the Chinese 
joint-venture partners in the Chinese political hierarchy. In China, firms are regulated by nine 
different levels of the government, e.g., central government, provincial government, city and county 
government, and so forth. We created this variable with the idea that ECE and non-ECE investors 
may systematically differ in terms of their levels in the regulatory hierarchy. In our empirical 
implementation, we added a control on POLHCHY and experimented with different cutoff values 
for POLHCHY. Our empirical findings are unaffected by these specification checks.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The results are available from the authors upon request.    23
4. Empirical Models and Results  
In Table 1.A, we present summary statistics of the main variables used in the regression 
models in the Appendix. The dataset covers companies in 31 provinces from 1998 to 2005. The 
average employment level in the census of companies is 311 headcounts, with a standard deviation 
of 697. The employees enjoy an average wage of 15,611.93 yuan and mean fringe benefits of 489.07 
yuan. The companies are relatively young in age, with a mean of approximately six years and a 
standard deviation of four years. There is a wide range among the companies in terms of exports, 
capital, and performance. On average, firms in the CIC hold 982 million yuan in total assets and 451 
million yuan in equity, leverage half of the assets, and earn a profit of 58 million yuan.  The average 
sales value among these companies is 681 million yuan, and one-third of the sales are exported. The 
companies are not very labor-intensive, with a mean labor-intensiveness (defined as the labor-capital 
ratio) of 0.14 and a standard deviation of 0. 20. That is, on average the firms have one worker for 
every 10,000 yuan of capital (roughly US$1,200 based on the exchange rates during our sample 
period). 
[Insert Table 1.A around here.] 
To get a general sense of how the ECE firms differ from the non-ECE firms, we tabulated 
the summary statistics for these two samples of firms separately in Table 1.B. Over the full sample, 
the ECE firms have a slightly lower average performance than the non-ECE firms, as measured by 
three alternative proxies including net margin, ROA, and ROE. The two camps of enterprises 
engage in almost identical levels of discretionary accrual and leverage, and comparable levels of 
transfer pricing (to the best that we could approximate). On average, the ECE firms are less labor-  24
intensive and are about one year older than the non-ECE firms. As compared to the ECEs, the non-
ECE firms are larger in size, as reflected by the higher mean values of exports, sales, equity, and 
total assets. They also own more intangibles, offer higher wages and fringe benefits, and earn higher 
total profits. 
[Insert Table 1.B around here.] 
We set out to test the hypothesis that FDI firms that are owned and managed by people of 
the same ethnic origin are more profitable than FDI firms with ethnically diverse owners and 
managers. This is built on the core hypothesis in the literature on the economic effects of ethnicity. 
Because joint ventures require the most intensive form of communications and mutual trust, we 
estimate our models mainly for this subsample of companies, and test for possible differential 
effects on firm performance among the ECE and non-ECE FDI firms. We repeat the analysis on 
the non-joint-venture subsample to check for the robustness of the results and to note any potential 
different patterns.  We then explore potential mechanisms for any performance implications of the 
ECE investments.   
Since the status of the ECEs remains the same for each firm over the sample period and we 
do not have any information on the firms prior to the inception of ECE status, a selection model 
would not be appropriate here. In light of the differences between ECEs and non-ECEs as noted in 
Table 1.B, we controlled for as many relevant characteristics as observed in the dataset through a 
combination of semi-parametric stratifications and panel analyses. 
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4.1. Testing the Static Effects of the ECEs 
The benchmark model to test the two camps of theories on ethnicity and firm performance 
is a year-, company-, and province-fixed effects regression model carried out in the samples of joint-
venture (JV) companies and non-JV companies separately: 
Performanceit = β0*ECEit + β1*logassetsit + β2*leverageit + β3*labor-Intensivenessit 
+β4*ageit +β5*ProvDumi +β6*FirmDumi+β7*YearDumt +εit (1)   
where Performanceit={netmarginit, ROEit, ROAit},  εit is the regression residual, and β’s are the 
coefficients on the respective covariates. The main variable of interest is β0. 
The results are reported in Table 2.A. There are negative and mostly insignificant or 
marginally significant coefficients on ECE for the regressions at all three measures of performance. 
This implies that after controlling for all the company and province effects and the set of traditional 
covariates, there is no robust and significantly positive relation between ECE investments and a 
company’s performance. If anything, there seems to be a negative association between ECE 
investment and firm performance, especially for the non-JV sample. This finding provides some 
initial evidence that contradicts the theoretical conjecture, based on the informational and 
knowledge advantages of co-ethnic networks, that ECE firms outperform their non-ECE 
counterparts. The coefficients on labor-intensiveness are positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level for the three performance measures in the JV sample, but less significant (and still positive) for 
the non-JV sample.  The coefficient on age is insignificant for the JV sample and negative and 
marginally significant for the non-JV sample, and log assets are positive and significant for the JV 
sample but negative and mostly significant for the non-JV sample. The “Leverage” variable takes on   26
positive coefficients that are significant at the 1 percent level for the specifications with the three 
alternative performance measures and in both the JV and non-JV samples.  
[Insert Table 2.A around here] 
It is sometimes conjectured that ECE firms engage in more transfer-pricing activities than 
non-ECE firms. Transfer pricing refers to the practice of under-reporting profits by either under-
invoicing exports or over-invoicing imports. ECE firms are suspected to deploy this practice more 
frequently because many ECE firms engage in export-processing operations. By its underground 
nature, it is very difficult to measure transfer pricing precisely. Since transfer pricing is usually 
practiced by under-reporting exports, we define the first proxy as the exports as a ratio of the total 
output.
11  Our regression shows that this transfer-pricing proxy does not correlate with ECE 
significantly, after controlling for the set of relevant covariates in the JV sample (coefficient = -
.0005, se= .003, and t-stat= -0.17, Column 1 in Table 2.B). 
We then regressed the three performance measures on the ECE indicator, the transfer-
pricing proxy, the political hierarchy level to which the company answers,
12 and the set of traditional 
controls as specified in Model 1.  Upon adding the transfer-pricing control, the coefficients on the 
ECE indicator did not change in terms of magnitude and sign from those reported in Table 2.A. To 
preserve space, only the results for the ROA specifications are tabulated in Table 2.B. 
                                                 
11 Ideally, we would want to also include controls to address imports, but our full dataset does not give the 
import level for the entire sample. For the 1998-2001 subsample, we do have import data. We re-did our transfer-
pricing tests for those years by proxying the transfer pricing as exports and imports, and the results are qualitatively 
similar. 
12 Specifically, a set of dummy variables are generated from this categorical variable of hierarchy and are 
included as the regressors.    27
We also generated an alternative proxy for measuring transfer pricing, namely, exports as a 
fraction of total sales, to check on the robustness of the results. Bearing in mind the potential 
differences between the completely domestic companies and the firms that export, we stratified the 
dataset into the group that targets only the domestic market, voluntarily or involuntarily (no demand 
for exports), and the four other groups according to the remaining quartile values of the export-sales 
ratio variable. Within each stratum, we repeated the regression of the performance measures on the 
transfer-pricing variable and the set of controls. These analyses yielded negative and statistically 
insignificant coefficients on the ECE indicator.  In another set of unreported robustness checks, we 
also replaced the transfer-pricing proxy by the ratio variable of exports as a share of sales in the 
regression analysis within each stratum. This yielded inconsistent ECE coefficient signs and 
significance levels. 
We initiated these transfer-pricing tests to address the concern that the lower accounting 
performance among ECE firms was driven by transfer pricing rather than by the operations of ECE 
firms. If so, the ECE coefficients should be very sensitive to the inclusion of a transfer-pricing 
variable. That is not the case. After the control, the ECE dummy is never positive and significant. In 
fact, in all the specifications, the ECE coefficient is negative and insignificant. 
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Discussion of Alternative Explanations of the Static Effect of the ECEs 
There are a variety of reasons we can think of that potentially explain our findings. We 
discuss several of them, including non-profit-maximization motivations, a “trial and error” approach 
of ECE investment, and complacency caused by lack of competition.  
 Field research uncovers evidence that ECE firms invested heavily in their own home 
regions with the explicit purpose of benefiting the local economies and the local residents.
13  Along 
with their investment projects, they often donated to schools and hospitals. These “altruistic” 
investment motivations, although perfectly aligned with the utility functions of the overseas Chinese 
investors, may not lead to profitable investment projects by conventional benchmarks. If that is the 
reason for the observed lower performance of ECE FDI, then it might appear that these 
“hometown investments” by ECEs would have a lower “hurdle rate.”  It would not be surprising 
that when measured by the usual performance measures, the ECE investments appear to be less 
profitable. If this is the explanation for our findings on the static effect of ethnicity on performance, 
then it will likely be a larger problem for the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, home to the 
ancestors of most overseas Chinese. In addition, if an altruistic investment motive is behind the 
observed pattern, there is no a priori reason why the pattern should change over time as the firm 
ages. 
                                                 
13 Evidence reported by Ezra Vogel in his research on Guangdong province of China shows that many 
Hong Kong firms return to do business in their ancestral home regions. He notes that in the late 1980s half of the 
export-processing contracts in the Dongguan region of Guangdong were with former Dongguan residents living in 
Hong Kong (Vogel 1989, p. 176).   29
Another possible explanation is that the lower performance of ECE investment is an 
indication of a “trial-and-error” approach taken by some ECE investors. It has been observed that 
investments from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan in mainland China tend to be smaller. For 
example, Huang (2003) reports that Hong Kong firms that invested in China are smaller than Hong 
Kong firms that invested in other countries. In our sample, on average the ECEs tend to be smaller 
than the non-ECEs. It is theoretically possible that ECE investors aim to use some of these small-
scale investments as pilot projects to test the water, so as to accumulate experience for larger 
projects later on. The cultural proximity might enable and even encourage some of the ECE 
investors to take such a trial-and-error approach with small experiments because even if the 
investments fail, they might not be too detrimental to the relationship, particularly if there is already 
a strong pre-existing relationship. If the pilot projects succeed, they could then be used as a base to 
build a large capacity. In a sense, this investment approach is akin to the purchase of a call option: 
although it might expire out of money from time to time, it allows the flexibility for bigger follow-up 
investments. If this is the reason for our findings thus far, then when focusing on the larger FDI 
made by the ECE and non-ECE investors, the effect that we observe should disappear. 
Another more complicated explanation deals with the complacency that might arise due to 
the “edge” that a closely knit social network might initially provide. In other words, the initial 
advantage (or lower hurdle to entry) enjoyed by ECE investors might cause some investors to enter 
for the “wrong” reason. For example, the cultural proximity enjoyed by ECE investors might lower 
the fixed costs of setting up the FDI, thus allowing some more marginal projects to be profitable in 
earlier years. However, if these ECE investors fail to build a sustainable production capacity, then,   30
over time, as the non-ECE investors overcome the higher hurdles of cultural barriers and catch-up, 
the ECE investors will lose their edge. Similarly, if an overseas Chinese investor only recruits his 
friends and family in the management of his firm, the costs of operations might be lower initially, as 
there is less asymmetric information and fewer agency problems, but this choice limits the firm to a 
narrow human-capital base. Over time, such a limitation in human capital may matter, particularly 
for businesses that rely heavily on managerial expertise and technology. A key feature of a co-ethnic 
network is the idea of privilege—insider knowledge and preferential information enjoyed by 
members of the network, are the exclusion of non-affiliated but potentially capable human capital 
(Casella and Rauch 2002). This theorizing about ethnic networks closely resembles criticisms that 
economists have leveled on family firms (Bertrand et al. 2002, Bae et al. 2002, Chang 2003, Coff 
1999, and Baek et al. 2006), especially in the emerging economies (La Porta et al. 2000). It generates 
the prediction that the performance of ECEs might deteriorate further over time, compared to that 
of non-ECEs. 
We next turn to the tests on the dynamic effects of ECEs to try to differentiate the various 
scenarios. 
 
4.2. Testing the Dynamic Effects of ECEs 
The above discussion gives rise to different predictions about how the comparative 
advantages of ECEs change over time. To examine the dynamic effects of ECE investment on firm 
performance, we generated the interaction variables between the ECE indicator and firm age 
(ECE*Age).    31
 
Performanceit = β0*ECE*Ageit +β1*ECEit+ β2*Ageit +β3*leverageit +β4*labor-intensivenessit  
+ β5*logassetsit +β6*YearDumt+β7*ProvDumi +β8*FirmDumi+εit         (2) 
 
A positive and significant coefficient on β0 would indicate that ECE firms enjoy increasingly 
higher operational advantages. Conversely, a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction 
term would indicate that over time, compared to the non-ECE firms, the performance of ECE firms 
becomes worse. The regression results for the above tests are shown in Table 3. The results do 
indeed show negative β0’s, statistically significant at the 1 percent level using the three alternative 
performance measures (Row 1 in Table 3). In addition, β1 appears negative, and significantly so in 
some specifications. For example, in the regression reported in Table 3 for the joint-venture sample, 
the coefficient on the ECE*age Interaction term is -0.0239, with a t-statistics of -3.87, and the 
coefficient on the ECE dummy is -0.0103, with a t-statistics of -1.37 in the regression with ROA as 
the performance measure. This suggests that ECE FDI initially has a small and statistically 
insignificant disadvantage in performance, but the disadvantage intensifies over time. The increasing 
ECE disadvantage shown in our data may be reconciled with the theories that predict the dynamic 
inefficiencies of ethnic ties in Section 1.  These ethnic ties point to the potential limitations of 
human capital and other shortsighted or non-profit-maximizing investment behavior. We are able to 
directly test these suggested underlying mechanisms in the next section, using the rich data at hand. 
[Insert Table 3 around here]   32
We performed various robustness checks to the baseline regression results. It is entirely 
possible that the ECE and non-ECE firms differ on many other important dimensions, and our 
linear control on these characteristics may be insufficient to fully absorb the impact of these 
differences in characteristics on the dynamic pattern of firm performance. To better address this 
possibility, we took advantage of the degree of freedom endowed by the rich dataset to perform a 
regression analysis with higher order controls on the control variables, but we did not find a 
qualitatively different pattern. We also directly addressed the potential impact of transfer pricing on 
the observed dynamic pattern by directly controlling both the ratio of exports to total sales and our 
measure of transfer pricing. The main results of the regression analysis remain unchanged. In fact, in 
most specifications, adding these additional controls further strengthens the results that show that 
there is a dynamic inefficiency of ECE investments. We report one version of the robustness-check 
results in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
There are still negative coefficients on ECE that interacted with the year or ECE interacted 
with age respectively.  These findings were significant at the 1 percent level for the three 
performance measures. The coefficients on the squared terms of age and labor-intensiveness are 
negative and significant.  In addition, the coefficients on the squared log assets are all opposite the 
signs on the linear terms, indicating potential concavity in their relationship with performance. 
Overall, qualitatively the results of the ECE effects are the same as those reported in the previous 
tables. 
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4.3.    Exploring the Mechanism for the ECE Effects 
We probe into the mechanism for the declining advantage of ECEs over the past years. As 
reasoned in Section 3.1, one potential explanation for our findings so far is that ECE investors are 
myopic and do not build sustainable capacity. This would be reflected in their lower average 
intangible assets, lower human capital, and lower maintenance of production capacity.  To examine 
this hypothesis, we first conducted a regression analysis on the intangible assets or average wage 
level by regressing these on a variety of firm characteristics and an ECE dummy.  
Intangible assets as defined in our data very closely resemble accounting treatments in the 
United States, including patented and non-patented technology and know-how, brand name and 
trademarks, royalties, various types of licensed rights and franchise rights, and goodwill. The Chinese 
accounting standard also allows for the amortization of the intangible assets in a fashion that closely 
resembles that of the United States. The intangibles exhibit positive and significant time trends over 
the sampled years for the non-ECE firms, netting out the firm- and province-fixed effects, 
indicating that our average non-ECE firms are spending heavily to build up their intangible assets 
over time.  This is not true for the ECE firms. 
Our regression results, summarized in Table 5, confirm that the ECE firms in our sample 
significantly under-invest in intangible assets and human capital compared to the non-ECE firms, 
controlling for other firm characteristics. In particular, the ECE indicator carries negative and highly 
significant coefficients in regressions with intangibles or wages as alternative response variables, 
controlling for year-, industry-, and province-fixed effects.   
[Insert Table 5 around here]   34
We further demonstrate how the differences in intangibles and human capital between the 
ECE and non-ECE investors may link with the differences in their performance. We first stratified 
the dataset into six subsamples by the value of the intangibles: the first subsample contains firms 
that have zero intangibles and the five other subsamples contain five subsamples of firms based on 
the quintiles of intangibles to which these firms belong. The first subsample consists of a little more 
than 40 percent of the companies, with almost an even split between the ECE and non-ECE firms; 
the latter five subsamples approximately account for about 60 percent of the sample, with 22,252 
ECE and 39,495 non-ECE firms, respectively, roughly evenly distributed among the five quintiles. 
For each of the performance measures, we regressed the performance measure on the ECE 
indicator variable, ECE and age interaction term, firm age, and a variety of the control variables used 
in Table 2, controlling for the province, industry, and year dummies.   
Table 6 presents the summary of the regression coefficients on the ECE*age interaction 
terms and the corresponding t-statistics. As can be seen, for each of the strata of the data where 
firms have relatively similar levels of intangible investments, the ECE*age coefficients become 
statistically insignificant. In fact, they become positive for lower levels of the intangible investments.  
Combined with the earlier evidence that when regressing intangibles on ECE*age and the set of 
usual controls in the whole sample, ECE*age is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  Also, ECE firms engage in significantly fewer intangible investments. The new results present 
strong evidence that the intangibles are the underlying mechanism (or at least an important factor) 
for the diminishing ECE advantages that we discovered earlier.     
[Insert Table 6 around here.]   35
We then examine the theory that predicts an efficiency loss in ethnic ties due to non-
expertise-based employment. Wages are widely used to proxy for worker productivity in labor 
economics. We therefore stratified the sample according to the quintiles of wage levels to test 
whether ECE firms still experience a dynamic disadvantage when compared with non-ECE firms 
with a similar level of average wages. Table 7 summarizes the regression coefficients for ECE*age 
for the regression analysis across the five quintiles of average wages, three performance measures, 
and for both the JV and non-JV subsamples. The results imply that the ECEs’ inferior human 
capital investments—possibly arising from either the trust in human resources exclusively within the 
local ethnic network or from the lack of incentives to invest in non-cultural business expertise—are 
an important underlying mechanism driving down the ethnic advantage over time. 
[Insert Table 7 around here.] 
The fact that the dynamic inefficiency of ECE dissipates when we compare ECE firms of 
similar technology and knowledge intensity offers convincing evidence that the overall dynamic 
inefficiency of ECE is not driven by policy development, which would have affected all the ECE 
firms the same way over time. 
 
5. Other Robustness Checks  
We performed additional tests to check the robustness of our results and also to rule out 
several alternative explanations of our findings. We first experimented with including higher-order 
terms and deploying quantile (LAV) and Huber regressions. We then conducted tests for various   36
alternative explanations of our findings. Some other robustness checks were also performed, but, to 
preserve space, these are detailed in the Appendix. 
 
5. 1.   Quantile Regressions and Huber Regressions 
To avoid the potential biases from outlier data points, we carried out bootstrap quantile 
regressions and robustness regressions analyses. Unlike the OLS regression, a quantile regression 
models a Least Absolute Value (LAV) distribution and minimizes absolute loss instead of squared 
loss function, and the robustness regression models a Huber distribution. The regression estimates 
resulting from both these alternative models are less affected by outliers. The magnitudes and 
statistical significance of the coefficient estimates remain similar. 
 
5. 2. Checking the Sensitivity of the Effect on Leverage 
We conducted various sensitivity analyses by adding the control covariates one by one, and 
the results are robust. The coefficient significance levels do not change significantly, and even the 
magnitudes change very little. We report a series of results in one such sensitivity analysis.  As a 
result, we eliminated the “leverage” variable (and its higher order terms, if any) from the regressions 
for all the results. There is a very high relationship between leverage and firm performance, but we 
do not know exactly why this is the case. It might be, for example, that firms that are more 
profitable have an easier time obtaining loans. Tables A.1 – A.3 confirm that this leverage effect 
does not drive our results. Our findings are not sensitive to either including or excluding the 
leverage effect.   37
[Insert Tables A.1 – A.3 about here] 
 
5.3. Ruling out Alternative Explanations 
Some may conjecture that the empirical patterns might also be explained by the preferred 
policy treatment that ECE firms receive initially. When the policy becomes more non-discriminatory 
over time, the advantages of ECE firms dwindle.  A careful historical review suggests that the policy 
has been uniformly non-discriminatory for all FDI since the early 1990s. Although FDI might 
receive preferred treatment over domestic investments, there is no explicit policy preference for 
ECE-based FDI over non-ECE-based FDI during the sample period.  
It may be difficult to rule out the possibility that some “implicit” benefits are given to ECE 
firms, especially in the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, where relatives of many of the ECE 
investors reside. One way to address this is to test whether the empirical patterns we document 
differ depending on whether a firm is in Guangdong and Fujian. If policy preference plays a role, 
then it is possible that the ECEs in these places will outperform the others.  
Another motivation for a separate test on the subsample of firms in Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces is to address the concern that non-profit-maximizing motives might explain some of the 
investments made by overseas Chinese with relatives residing in Guangdong and Fujian. It is 
theoretically possible that, if the goal of some ECE investing in Guangdong and Fujian is for such 
“altruistic” reasons, then they would exhibit different performance patterns from those non-ECE 
investments, and that could affect our comparison of ECE and non-ECE investment performance.   38
However, if that is the case, it is difficult to imagine that a similar effect will also be observed for 
firms in the rest of the country. 
We therefore repeated all the analyses on two subsamples. One subsample included firms in 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces only, and the other subsample excluded these two provinces. 
Tables A.4 – A.5 display the main results for the first subsample. The results are again robust in that 
the ECEs exhibit significant dynamic inefficiencies in their performance compared to the non-
ECEs, as illustrated by the negative and highly significant coefficients on the interaction between 
ECE and age in the regressions of the three performance dependent variables (Table A.5). 
Stratification analyses based on intangibles and wages again explain away such inefficiency within 
each stratum. That is, ECEs perform just as profitably, if not better, than non-ECEs when they have 
similar levels of intangibles and human capital. The results for the second subsample are qualitatively 
the same. 
In sum, the observed patterns still exist when we focus on the two subsamples – Guangdong 
and Fujian – and the rest of the provinces. We are more certain that such a pattern is not explained 
by either the policy preference toward the ECEs or the altruistic investment motivation of the 
ECEs. We can rule out the “hometown effect” or the “policy preference to ECE effect” to explain 
our empirical findings.    
[Insert Tables A.4 – A.5 about here] 
 
 
   39
5.4. Test Based on the Subsample of Large FDI 
As explained above, one remaining possibility is that smaller FDI is more likely used to 
conduct pilot studies and to enable a “learning-by-doing” FDI approach. It is possible that ECE 
firms are more likely to engage in these trial-and-error types of investments because the cultural 
proximity enables them to conduct such pilot studies at lower fixed costs. If so, then the 
performance of the smaller FDI may be contaminated with this alternative motivation for FDI.  
To address this concern without having any information on the investors or their decisions 
to enter the Chinese market, we tested whether the empirical pattern still holds for large firms. We 
included tests for the subsample of all firms (both ECEs and non-ECEs) that are above the median 
size in the sample. We define the median firm size across all firms (both ECEs and non-ECEs) for 
each year and then selected the above-median subsample.  
The empirical results from this semi-parametric control of firm size, which is a key factor 
whereby the ECEs and non-ECEs differ, are encouragingly robust. As Tables A.6 – A.7 show, all 
the findings convey the same qualitative intuitions as earlier. Although ECE has an insignificant 
relationship with the performance measures pooled across all eight years, its interaction with the age 
variable carries negative and significant coefficients in Table A.7. This dynamic inefficiency of ECEs 
among the large firms is estimated to be even stronger than that among the entire sample of firms, 
both in magnitude and level of statistical significance. Stratification analyses reveal similar evidence 
of under-investment in intangibles and human capital as the culprit for ECE dynamic inefficiencies. 
[Insert Tables A.6 – A.7 around here] 
   40
5. 5. Tabulations for Checking Alternative Stories 
Consider the following: if non-ECE foreign investors are very reluctant to form joint 
ventures, they may request a higher certainty of performance before committing to a joint venture. 
Otherwise they would rather remain as a wholly-owned foreign enterprise. In contrast, ECE 
investors, who are culturally similar to the Chinese, are more open to the joint-venture idea and are 
less selective in choosing investment thresholds.  If that scenario holds, there may be a systematic 
difference in the levels of performance by ECE-JVs and non-JVs as well as by non-ECE-JVs and 
non-ECE-non-JVs. We tabulated the levels of performance by the ECE-JVs, ECE-non-JVs, non-
ECE-JVs, and non-ECE-non-JVs, but did not find significant differences in the levels of the net 
margin across groups. The JV firms tend to have lower mean levels of ROE and ROA compared to 
the wholly foreign-owned enterprises. This result contradicts the story laid out at the beginning of 
this section. 
We also tested the idea that the ECE effect shows up not in the mean levels of performance 
but in the variance levels. For example, ECE firms may face lower investment risks even though 
their performance is lower. One explanation might be their cultural aversion to risks. To test any 
differences in the variance levels of profits, after controlling for everything else, we implemented the 
following procedure: 1) regress the performance on the full control variables, 2) tabulate the residual 
of the regression, which is the performance left unexplained by all the control factors, along the lines 
of ECE versus non-ECE, and calculate the means, standard errors, and higher moments of the 
residuals.  The results indicate almost identical higher moments (variance, skewness, and kurtosis) of   41




  Using a comprehensive dataset of FDI firms in China, we explore the question of whether 
ethnicity enhances firm performance. We demonstrate empirically that ethnic firms do not 
automatically command a performance advantage over non-ethnic firms. We also find that over 
time, compared to non-ethnic firms, the performance of ethnic firms deteriorates. Our results 
suggest that under-investment in intangible assets and human capital could be the reason of the 
observed differences in the performance patterns over time. Overall, our results reject the naïve 
extrapolation of the existing evidence that, since a pre-existing relationship facilitate economic 
activities; ethnic firms will necessarily perform better.  
It should be noted that our study focuses only on data from China and thus is not a 
demonstration of a prevalence of under-performance of ethnically-linked economic activities. That 
said, our findings cast some doubt on the simple notion that ethnic ties, while facilitating 
transactions, necessarily lead to better performance (as measured by profitability). To the extent that 
a substantial portion of FDI in many countries, particularly in developing economies, is comprised 
of ethnically-linked FDI, our results shed useful light on the overall patterns of ethnically-linked 
activities. Ethnic ties belong to one specific category of relationships which economists have studied 
beyond the question of FDI. We hope that our paper also contributes to this broader literature.   42
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 Appendix: Other Robustness Checks 
 In this Appendix, we perform additional robustness checks.  
 
A.  Clustered Regressions and Other Measures for Avoiding Outliers 
In empirical studies, one needs to be very careful about potential outliers that can drive 
results in a particular direction. Taking advantage of our large dataset, we can afford to employ 
various robustness checks. One involves truncating outliers, as we did for the ratio variables like 
ROE, ROA, and net margin. The second round of checking involves dropping industries that 
contain fewer than three companies in the specifications with industry-fixed effects.  In these 
models, the results for industries with only one company are essentially point estimates and are 
susceptible to outliers. Alternative random effects models are tested and results remained robust.  It 
is nonetheless worth checking the robustness of the results in a sample consisting of industries with 
more regular company numbers. To our comfort, the results remain unchanged.  In a third round of 
checks, we employed regression analyses with standard errors clustered at the industry level to check 
for robustness, but this did not alter the results in any significant way either.  
Although controlling for industry effects detailed at the four-digit level helps to remove any 
potential sector-specific factors, it might be too fine a breakdown to reveal other interesting 
patterns. We therefore also conducted robustness checks using three-digit classifications of 
industries.  Again, the results were robust.  
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B. Sensitivity  Analyses   
We added more control variables than those defined in the data section to the benchmark 
model one at a time in the first round of analyses, and then adding controls one by one in a 
subsequent round of analyses.
14 These variables include ownership categories (such as TVE or PE), 
exports as a fraction of sales, exports to ECEs or non-ECEs, various specifications of the political 
hierarchy levels of the Chinese partnership firms, and measures of firm size. We also included a 
group of interaction variables: between the ECE dummy and the exports-sales ratio, between the 
ECE dummy and various political hierarchy level dummies, between the ECE dummy and 
ownership types (TVE or PE), and between the ECE dummy and various size dummies. All these 
regression specifications yield similarly negative and statistically significant coefficients on 
ECE*Year and ECE*Age. 
 
C. Stratification  Analyses 
For some Chinese firms, especially credit-constrained small-scale private firms, forming joint 
ventures may be a mechanism to obtain financing. It is possible that small private enterprises have 
different incentives, as compared with other firms, to seek joint-venture partners. To the extent that 
small Chinese private firms seek out ECE firms for alliances, ECE and non-ECE firms may vary in 
their performance.  We carried out regressions on the whole sample and on the TVE subgroup, 
controlling for the private enterprise indicator variable (PE). The variable PE and the stratification 
analyses did not change the existing coefficients in a statistically significant manner. 
                                                 
14 The results are robust to the order of the variable additions.   48
 
D. Residual Analyses 
Controlling for intangibles or wages does not mask the significant effects on ECE*time. To 
allow for non-linear relationships, we tried specifications with the spline of the intangibles or wages. 
We implemented a two-step procedure: first regressing the net margin on the spline of the 
intangibles and the spline of wages, fixed assets/depreciation, the regular set of company controls, 
and fixed effects. We then regressed the residuals from the first regression on the ECE indicator and 
the set of regular controls we used in our main specifications. The ECE effect netting out the 
intangibles, wages, and other controls are substantially smoother. The only anomaly is 1998, with a 
positive ECE effect. 
 
E. Analyses within Each Industry 
We also obtained the regression coefficient estimates on the ECE indicator variable with the 
three alternative performance outcomes within each industry. No systematic pattern prevailed: both 
positive and negative ECE effects are found in both high-tech and low-tech industries. The two 
industries for which we found large positive ECE coefficients are the vinegar industry and the mini-
car industry.  We also conducted robustness analyses using more-aggregated industry codes at the 
three-digit level instead of at the four-digit level, and the directions and significance levels of the 
coefficients on the ECE indicator and on the interaction variables were robust. 
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F. Other Performance Measures and Seemingly-Unrelated-Regressions (SUR) 
To check the robustness of the profits reported in the CIC, we also repeated the analyses 
using all the different profits recorded in the database.  The analyses were also used to calculate our 
performance measures: net margin, ROA, and ROE. The different profit variables include operating 
profits (yinye liren), production profits, and total taxable profits.  To avoid potential correlations 
among errors across specifications, we used the SUR system. Although the regressions using 
different profit indicators lead to different coefficient magnitudes, similar qualitative conclusions on 
the ECE dynamic inefficiency follow those reported in the main text. 
 
G. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Analyses 
Another major piece of analysis that we conducted was the difference-in-difference-in-
difference (DDD) model.   
 
Performanceit = β0*ECEit*Yeart*Wageit+β1*ECEit*Wageit + β2*ECEit*Yeart + β3*Wageit*Yeart+ 
β4*ECEit+  β5*logassetsit + β6*leverageit + β7*labor-intensivenessit 
+β8*Wageit+β9*ageit+β10*YearDumt+β11*ProvDumi +β12*IndDumit+εit            (4) 
 
where we added the three-way interaction among the ECE indicator, the year trend, and the 
intangible variables (ECE*year*wage) to model (2). The coefficient of interest here is β0 on the 
three-way interaction variable in model (4). The estimated β0 can be expressed as follows: 
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where y refers to performance measures, subscripts I and t refer to intangibles and year, respectively, 
and ECE or non-ECE take their usual meanings as defined in this paper. The DDD estimate starts 
with the time change in average performance for the firms with intangible assets in the ECE group 
and then nets out the change in mean performance for the firms with above-median wage levels 
(human capital proxy) in the non-ECE group, as well as the change in mean performance for the 
firms with below-median wage levels in the ECE group. The advantage of this method is that it 
controls for two kinds of potentially confounding trends: changes in performance over time for 
firms with intangible assets across the ECE and non-ECE groups for reasons that have nothing to 
do with their ECE status, and changes in the performance of all ECE firms with similar human 
capital (possibly due to other reasons associated with intangible assets that affect performance but 
are unrelated to ECE status).  The DDD estimator is positive and significant at the 5 percent or 10 
percent levels, and the coefficient on ECE*year is negative. These illustrate the following: The ECE 
advantage diminishes over time, and a firm's investments in intangibles (including R&D, advertising, 
brand-building, etc.) ameliorate the diminishing patterns in ECE advantages (i.e., make it less 
negative or even positive).  Variable Number of ObserMean Std. Dev Min Max
Net Margin 270610 0.33 0.52 -1 1
ROA 270610 0.35 0.50 -1 1
ROE 270610 0.37 0.59 -1 1
ECE 270610 0.55 0.50 0 1
Discretionary Accrual 270610 0.01 0.21 -1.63 1.23
Log(assets) 270610 10.24 1.36 0 17.61
Age 270610 5.95 3.84 0 25
Labor-intensiveness 270610 0.14 0.20 0 0.89
Leverage 270610 0.49 0.24 0 0.9996102
Transfer Pricing 270610 0.46 0.59 0 82.34
JV 270610 0.57 0.50 0 1
Relationship 270610 72.87 21.94 10 90
Export 270610 23261.50 43695.31 0 196800
Sales 270610 68055.93 124171.40 400 690500
asset_total 270610 98166.05 516892.30 1 44700000
worker 270610 310.53 696.72 0 94149
equity 270610 45069.14 258910.70 1 22900000
Intangible 270610 1899.69 5151.18 0 31265
Wage 270610 15.61 11.95 0.70 60
profit_total 270610 5799.15 70069.47 -1005665 11400000
benefit 270610 489.07 3126.42 -9255 496651
Year 270610 2002.19 2.28 1998 2005
Table 1.A: Summary Statistics for Variables Used In Empirical Analysis
Note: The political hierarchy level of a firm refers to the political party the firm answers to. This variable takes on 
value 10 if the firm answers to the central government, to 20 if provincial-level, to 40 if regional level, 50 if 
county-level, 61 if street-level, 62 if town-level, 63 if village-level, 71 if residential-association level, 72 if village-
association level, and 90 otherwise. The employment variable refers the number of persons employed in a firm. 
Export, capital, intangibles, total assets, equity, sales, profits, and wage are all variables as recorded in the original 
database. We generated the age variable by subtracting the firm's incorporation year from the year of the data. We 
calculated netmargin by profits divided by sales netting out discretionary accrual*assets/sales. ROA is return on 
assets and is defined as profits divided by the difference between total assets and profits, netting out discretionary 
accrual*assets/(assets-profits). ROE is return on equity and is defined as profits divided by equity, discretionary 
accrual*assets/equity. Labor-intensiveness is the capital/labor ratio. The leverage variable is defined as total assets 
subtract shareholder equity and then divided by total assets. Joint venture dummy takes value of one if the firm is a 
 joint venture corporation, and zero otherwise. In the database, the variable "register type" identifies the firm’s 
ownership. Foreign-affiliated firms have register type values between 200 and 340, with ECEs between 200 and 
240 and joint ventures being 210 and 310. Transfer pricing is defined as (exports-imports)/(total outputs).non-ECE ECE
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Net Margin 122826 0.33 0.51 -1 1 147784 0.32 0.52 -1 1
ROA 122826 0.36 0.49 -1 1 147784 0.34 0.50 -1 1
ROE 122826 0.38 0.58 -1 1 147784 0.36 0.60 -1 1
ECE 122826 0.00 0.00 0 0 147784 1.00 0.00 1 1
Discretionary Accruel 122826 0.01 0.20 -1.63 1.17 147784 0.01 0.21 -1.62 1.23
Log(assets) 122826 10.38 1.44 0 17.41 147784 10.11 1.27 0.69 17.61
Age 122826 5.51 3.75 0 25 147784 6.31 3.87 0 25
Labor-intensiveness 122826 0.17 0.22 0 0.89 147784 0.11 0.16 0 0.89
Leverage 122826 0.49 0.24 0 1.00 147784 0.50 0.24 0 1.00
Transfer Pricing 122826 0.44 0.56 0 82.34 147784 0.47 0.62 0 76.65
JV 122826 0.60 0.49 0 1 147784 0.54 0.50 0 1
Relationship 122826 71.63 23.52 10 90 147784 73.90 20.47 10 90
Export 122826 25184.53 46706.96 0 196800 147784 21663.24 40955.89 0 196800
Sales 122826 80941.58 142652.40 400 690500 147784 57346.44 105202.50 400 690500
asset_total 122826 125921.30 633914.60 1 36500000 147784 75098.15 392530.70 2 44700000
worker 122826 308.09 753.34 0 94149 147784 312.56 645.88 0 52100
equity 122826 58543.89 321567.80 1 22900000 147784 33870.03 191128.90 1 19200000
Intangible 122826 2522.74 6065.42 0 31265 147784 1381.86 4173.87 0 31265
Wage 122826 17.56 13.25 0.7 60 147784 13.99 10.47 0.7 60
profit_total 122826 8332.88 94022.45 -963799 11400000 147784 3693.31 40414.07 -1005665 4538144
benefit 122826 647.02 4153.84 -9255 496651 147784 357.80 1876.16 -1496 190179
Year 122826 2002.38 2.26 1998 2005 147784 2002.03 2.29 1998 2005
Note: variables are as defined in Table 1.A.




Observations(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy -0.0111 -0.0140 -0.0116 -0.0228 -0.0217 -0.0199
-1.42 -1.91 -1.2 -2.13 -2.12 -1.59
Log(assets) 0.0171 0.0131 0.0745 -0.0297 -0.0299 -0.0029
3.28 2.62 12.08 -4.98 -5.13 -0.43
Firm Age 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0055
0.48 -0.06 0.03 -1.93 -2.16 -1.89
Labor Intensiveness 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
2.79 4.37 2.37 1.4 2.9 1
Leverage 0.3595 0.3701 0.6434 0.3688 0.3938 0.6122
25.14 26.95 37.51 23.99 26.13 33.56
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3790 0.4024 0.2559 0.3084 0.3159 0.2111
Number of observation 153,588        153,588        153,588        116,987        116,987        116,987       
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 
through 3 are regressions for the joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. 
T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.
Table 2.A: The Relationship between ECE Designation and Firm Profitability
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Transfer Pricing
ECE dummy -0.0077 -0.0141 -0.0010 -0.0113 -0.0081 -0.0061 -0.0127
-0.34 -1.92 -0.08 -1.60 -1.40 -1.09 -1.47
export/sales -0.0064 0.2280 0.0083 0.0558 0.0006
-0.86 5.51 0.33 1.41 0.23
Log(assets) -0.0076 0.0132 0.0138 0.0262 -0.0170 -0.0416 -0.0268
-0.46 2.64 1.54 5.56 -6.80 -16.17 -5.42
Firm Age 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0197 -0.0222 -0.0287 -0.0277
0.92 -0.08 -0.95 -17.41 -22.37 -32.60 -17.04
Labor Intensiveness 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.81 4.39 3.35 -5.97 -2.32 1.40 -0.57
Leverage 0.0043 0.3703 0.3670 0.0357 0.0428 0.1350 0.0861
0.10 26.94 15.30 2.42 3.18 11.95 3.97
Hierarchy Fixed Effec YYYYYYY
Year Fixed Effects? YYYYYYY
Firm Fixed Effects? YYYYYYY
Province Fixed Effect YYYYYYY
Adjusted R-squared 0.4527 0.4026 0.4192 0.2905 0.3182 0.3127 0.3396














Table 2.B: The Relationship among ECE Designation, Transfer Pricing, and Firm Profitability
Dependent Variable
Note: The dependent variables are the difference in exports and imports, as a ratio of total outputs, in column (1), and 
ROA in other columns. Columns 1 and 2 are regressions for the whole ample, and columns 3 through 7 are for the five 
subsamples according to the export/sales levels (zero exports and quartiles 1 to 4 for positive export/sales levels). T-









exports(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy * Firm Age -0.0233 -0.0239 -0.0214 -0.0332 -0.0322 -0.0323
-3.57 -3.87 -2.72 -3.79 -3.83 -3.2
ECE dummy -0.0074 -0.0103 -0.0083 -0.0243 -0.0233 -0.0214
-0.93 -1.37 -0.85 -2.29 -2.29 -1.72
Log(assets) 0.0167 0.0126 0.0741 -0.0304 -0.0306 -0.0036
3.19 2.53 12 -5.1 -5.26 -0.53
Firm Age 0.0031 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0016
1.85 1.47 1.11 -0.33 -0.52 -0.52
Labor Intensiveness 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
2.82 4.41 2.4 1.5 3.01 1.1
Leverage 0.3598 0.3704 0.6436 0.3708 0.3958 0.6142
25.16 26.98 37.53 24.1 26.25 33.64
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3791 0.4025 0.2560 0.3086 0.3161 0.2112
Number of observation 153,588         153,588         153,588         116,987         116,987         116,987        
Table 3: The Relationship between ECE Designation, ECE Firm Age Interaction and Firm Profitability
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 through 3 
are regressions for the joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. T-statistics 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy * Firm Age -0.0339 -0.0346 -0.0318 -0.0553 -0.0535 -0.0515
-5 -5.34 -3.93 -5.66 -5.67 -4.73
ECE dummy 0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0170 -0.0162 -0.0142
0.01 -0.43 -0.09 -1.6 -1.6 -1.15
Log(assets) -0.5286 -0.4310 -0.4122 -0.4594 -0.4004 -0.3799
-8.31 -8.42 -8.64 -10.47 -9.37 -7.81
Firm Age -0.0811 -0.0796 -0.0808 -0.1239 -0.1196 -0.1198
-29.44 -30.58 -25.56 -32.78 -32.87 -28.13
Labor Intensiveness 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.74 -0.1 -1.78 -0.8 -0.96 -1.99
Leverage 0.1847 0.2020 0.0400 0.2151 0.2400 0.0861
4.29 4.95 0.81 4.91 5.63 1.7
Log(assets)^2 0.0282 0.0230 0.0252 0.0236 0.0205 0.0208
9.33 9.45 10.99 11.11 9.99 8.85
Firm Age^2 0.0051 0.0050 0.0050 0.0090 0.0087 0.0087
34.01 34.66 30.09 37.33 36.98 34.3
Leverage^2 0.1849 0.1762 0.6224 0.1453 0.1458 0.5537
4.45 4.52 12.01 3.24 3.33 9.86
Labor Intensiveness^2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.03 1.55 2.57 0.62 1.42 1.87
Export 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-4.39 -1.75 -1.21 -7.64 -6.7 -4.67
Transfer Pricing -0.0001 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0008 -0.0009
-0.02 -0.38 -0.39 -0.51 -0.18 -0.15
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Political Hierarchy FE? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.4004 0.4236 0.2731 0.3498 0.3560 0.2421
Number of observation 153,588      153,588      153,588      116,987      116,987      116,987     
Table 4: Robustness check on The Relationship between ECE Designation, ECE firm age interaction and Firm 
Profitability
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 through 
3 are regressions using ECE*year interaction terms, and columns 4 through 6 are regressions using ECE*firm age 
interaction terms. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.(1) (2) (3) (4)
JV sample Non-JV sample JV sample Non-JV sample
ECE Dummy -511.07 -166.40 -1.54 -2.32
-8.72 -4.04 -9.57 -12.41
Log(assets) 1824.04 1636.84 1.44 0.87
18.32 20.26 13.9 12.5
Labor Intensiveness 3.91 2.75 0.01 0.02
13.04 11.1 18.08 25.9
Leverage -526.19 -308.37 -0.20 2.46
-5.82 -4.78 -0.77 14.85
Firm Age -72.86 -18.08 0.17 0.16
-11.84 -2.95 8.27 14.19
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3547 0.3203 0.3129 0.2926
Number of observation 153,588                     116,987                     153,588                     116,987                    
Note: The dependent variables are the intangibles.  Columns 1 through 3 are regressions using ECE*year interaction 
terms, and columns 4 through 6 are regressions using ECE*firm age interaction terms. T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.
Table 5: the relation between ece and intangibles average wage
Dependent Variable
Intangible Average WageIntangible Quintile Net Margin ROA ROE
Intangible = 0 0.0041 0.0066 0.0085
1.05 1.7 1.62
Intangible Quintile = 1 0.0110 0.0051 0.0109
0.99 0.43 0.79
Intangible Quintile = 2 0.0090 0.0027 0.0062
0.86 0.27 0.46
Intangible Quintile = 3 0.0020 -0.0026 0.0034
0.17 -0.24 0.24
Intangible Quintile = 4 -0.0028 -0.0043 -0.0073
-0.26 -0.47 -0.61
Intangible Quintile = 5 -0.0165 -0.0168 -0.0172
-1.42 -1.48 -1.39
Intangible Quintile Net Margin ROA ROE
Intangible = 0 0.0195 0.0204 0.0246
3.34 3.51 3.68
Intangible Quintile = 1 0.0333 0.0310 0.0418
2.35 2.17 2.18
Intangible Quintile = 2 0.0219 0.0264 0.0360
1.56 1.83 2.18
Intangible Quintile = 3 0.0180 0.0137 0.0156
1.58 1.28 1.16
Intangible Quintile = 4 -0.0023 0.0007 -0.0044
-0.22 0.07 -0.38
Intangible Quintile = 5 0.0007 -0.0017 0.0017
0.05 -0.14 0.12
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  T-statistics 
based on clustered standard errors are below the coefficient estimates. Regressions control for year, industry and 
province fixed effects.
Table 6: Regression Coefficients of ECE*Age Term, for Various Intangible Quintiles
Panel A: JV Sample
Panel B: Non-JV Sample
Dependent Variable
Dependent VariableAverage Wage Quintile Net Margin ROA ROE
Average Wage Quintile = 1 -0.0002 -0.0054 0.0007
-0.02 -0.59 0.06
Average Wage Quintile = 2 0.0180 0.0191 0.0257
2.09 2.39 2.43
Average Wage Quintile = 3 0.0085 0.0123 0.0160
0.99 1.52 1.61
Average Wage Quintile = 4 0.0094 0.0097 0.0103
1.45 1.61 1.33
Average Wage Quintile = 5 -0.0100 -0.0092 -0.0105
-1.97 -1.88 -1.68
Average Wage Quintile Net Margin ROA ROE
Average Wage Quintile = 1 0.0111 0.0152 0.0238
0.9 1.16 1.48
Average Wage Quintile = 2 0.0262 0.0238 0.0300
2.18 1.99 1.91
Average Wage Quintile = 3 0.0166 0.0165 0.0195
1.68 1.71 1.64
Average Wage Quintile = 4 0.0170 0.0180 0.0236
2.31 2.55 2.55
Average Wage Quintile = 5 0.0214 0.0222 0.0262
3.4 3.6 3.53
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  T-statistics based 
on clustered standard errors are below the coefficient estimates. Regressions control for year, industry and province 
fixed effects.
Table 7: Regression Coefficients of ECE*Age Term, for Various Average Wage Quintiles
Panel A: JV Sample
Dependent Variable
Panel B: Non-JV Sample
Dependent Variable(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy -0.0117 -0.0147 -0.0127 -0.0215 -0.0204 -0.0185
-1.4941 -2.0003 -1.3151 -2.0079 -1.9945 -1.4783
Log(assets) 0.0445 0.0413 0.1234 0.0018 0.0037 0.0494
8.7921 8.5119 20.561 0.3166 0.6782 7.5595
Firm Age 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0048
0.3676 -0.1647 -0.1042 -1.7287 -1.9376 -1.6483
Labor Intensiveness 0 0 -0.0001 0 0 -0.0001
0.0907 1.0041 -2.4082 -1.1362 -0.2762 -3.1729
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Hierarchical Relationship FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3790 0.4024 0.2559 0.3084 0.3159 0.2111
Number of observation 153,588        153,588        153,588        116,987        116,987        116,987       
Table A.1: The Relationship between ECE Designation and Firm Profitability Without Controlling for Leverage
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance.  Columns 1 through 3 are regressions for the 
joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy * Firm Age -0.0213 -0.0221 -0.0185 -0.02 -0.0184 -0.01718
-3.3062 -3.613 -2.3899 -2.2865 -2.199 -1.74
ECE dummy -0.0083 -0.0113 -0.0098 -0.0225 -0.0213 -0.0191
-1.0519 -1.5082 -1.0087 -2.1099 -2.0952 -1.5322
Log(assets) 0.0441 0.0409 0.1231 0.0015 0.0035 0.0493
8.7096 8.4226 20.4885 0.2616 0.6266 7.528
Firm Age 0.0028 0.002 0.0017 -0.002 -0.0025 -0.0033
1.636 1.2588 0.8417 -0.7296 -0.9589 -1.0601
Labor Intensiveness 0 0 -0.0001 0 0 -0.0001
0.117 1.038 -2.387 -1.0845 -0.2201 -3.1401
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Hierarchical Relationship FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3791 0.4025 0.2560 0.3086 0.3161 0.2112
Number of observation 153,588      153,588      153,588      116,987      116,987      116,987     
Table A.2: The Relationship between ECE Designation, ECE Firm Age Interaction and Firm Profitability 
Without Controlling for Leverage
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 
through 3 are regressions for the joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. 
T-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.Intangible Quintile Net Margin ROA ROE
Intangible = 0 0.0045 0.007 0.0094
1.1543 1.8044 1.7917
Intangible Quintile = 1 0.0111 0.0051 0.0109
0.988 0.4295 0.7796
Intangible Quintile = 2 0.0103 0.0035 0.0092
0.9897 0.3408 0.6956
Intangible Quintile = 3 0.0041 -0.001 0.007
0.3656 -0.0986 0.5192
Intangible Quintile = 4 -0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0061
-0.1913 -0.4016 -0.5115
Intangible Quintile = 5 -0.0155 -0.0162 -0.0163
-1.356 -1.4356 -1.3199
Intangible Quintile Net Margin ROA ROE
Intangible = 0 0.0199 0.0208 0.0252
3.4706 3.6272 3.8751
Intangible Quintile = 1 0.0352 0.0327 0.045
2.4691 2.2849 2.3418
Intangible Quintile = 2 0.0241 0.0283 0.0389
1.77 2.0234 2.4336
Intangible Quintile = 3 0.0201 0.0155 0.0181
1.8101 1.4873 1.385
Intangible Quintile = 4 0.0003 0.0029 -0.0011
0.028 0.3061 -0.0977
Intangible Quintile = 5 0.0023 -0.0002 0.0035
0.1754 -0.0161 0.2421
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  T-statistics 
based on clustered standard errors are below the coefficient estimates. Regressions control for year, industry and 
province fixed effects.
Table A.3: Regression Coefficients of ECE*Age Term Without Controlling for Leverage, for Various 
Intangible Quintiles
Panel A: JV Sample
Dependent Variable
Panel B: Non-JV Sample
Dependent Variable(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy -0.0139 -0.0165 -0.0117 -0.0217 -0.0196 -0.0153
-1.1151 -1.3889 -0.7756 -1.6198 -1.5039 -0.9641
Log(assets) 0.0181 0.0104 0.0418 -0.0227 -0.0275 -0.021
2.056 1.2044 4.0435 -3.0026 -3.7104 -2.3935
Firm Age 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0062 -0.0062 -0.0063
0.062 -0.3782 -0.1371 -1.8 -1.8732 -1.603
Labor Intensiveness 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.885 1.2669 0.3591 1.9882 3.202 2.0447
Leverage 0.3165 0.3595 0.5834 0.3644 0.3987 0.603
13.4521 15.6757 20.4777 18.7909 20.834 26.0783
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3790 0.4024 0.2559 0.3084 0.3159 0.2111
Number of observation 43,741            43,741            43,741            60,060            60,060            60,060           
Table A.4: The Relationship between ECE Designation and Firm Profitability for the Guangdong and Fujian 
Subsample
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 through 3 
are regressions for the joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. T-statistics based 
on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy * Firm Age -0.033 -0.035 -0.0353 -0.0292 -0.0271 -0.0329
-2.5581 -2.8139 -2.2895 -2.2092 -2.1312 -2.1917
ECE dummy -0.0021 -0.004 0.0009 -0.0192 -0.0172 -0.0125
-0.1566 -0.3093 0.0528 -1.4134 -1.3048 -0.7774
Log(assets) 0.0177 0.01 0.0414 -0.0231 -0.0278 -0.0213
2.0112 1.1555 4.0028 -3.0468 -3.7531 -2.4357
Firm Age 0.0051 0.004 0.0047 -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0011
1.2898 1.0726 1.0784 -0.3873 -0.4786 -0.2331
Labor Intensiveness 0 0 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
0.9076 1.2975 0.3825 1.9975 3.213 2.0551
Leverage 0.3168 0.3598 0.5836 0.3653 0.3995 0.604
13.4644 15.693 20.4941 18.8252 20.8624 26.1042
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3791 0.4025 0.2560 0.3086 0.3161 0.2112
Number of observation 43,741           43,741           43,741           60,060           60,060           60,060          
Table A.5: The Relationship between ECE Designation, ECE Firm Age Interaction and Firm Profitability in the 
Guangdong and Fujian Subsample
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 through 3 
are regressions for the joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. T-statistics 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy 0.0008 -0.0066 -0.012 -0.0094 -0.0091 -0.0111
0.0709 -0.6879 -0.9149 -0.715 -0.7611 -0.7363
Log(assets) 0.0694 0.0512 0.1294 -0.0308 -0.0339 -0.0001
7.9781 6.4388 13.0188 -2.9764 -3.524 -0.0069
Firm Age -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0053 -0.0065 -0.0067
-0.8406 -0.8022 -0.5528 -1.5662 -2.1255 -1.7856
Labor Intensiveness 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
2.0987 3.3414 2.1061 2.0638 3.4565 1.4914
Leverage 0.4469 0.3628 0.6545 0.4273 0.3588 0.5977
19.4255 18.0177 24.533 17.0859 15.9378 21.1609
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3790 0.4024 0.2559 0.3084 0.3159 0.2111
Number of observation 77,731          77,731          77,731          57,547          57,547          57,547         
Table A.6: The Relationship between ECE Designation and Firm Profitability for the Subsample of Firms Whose Size 
is Above Median Each Year
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 through 3 
are regressions for the joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. T-statistics based 
on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Margin ROA ROE Net Margin ROA ROE
ECE dummy * Firm Age -0.0427 -0.0411 -0.0443 -0.0465 -0.0447 -0.0488
-4.7646 -5.1304 -4.2476 -4.0476 -4.2589 -3.7984
ECE dummy 0.0088 0.0011 -0.0037 -0.0083 -0.0081 -0.01
0.7854 0.1091 -0.279 -0.6316 -0.6729 -0.66
Log(assets) 0.069 0.0508 0.129 -0.032 -0.035 -0.0013
7.9231 6.3828 12.9715 -3.0914 -3.6469 -0.1154
Firm Age 0.0025 0.0026 0.0032 -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0012
1.0968 1.2574 1.1766 -0.0169 -0.4383 -0.3052
Labor Intensiveness 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
2.176 3.4368 2.1876 2.1982 3.615 1.6338
Leverage 0.4476 0.3635 0.6552 0.4321 0.3633 0.6026
19.4665 18.0761 24.57 17.2433 16.1269 21.3068
Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed Effects? Y Y Y Y Y Y
Province Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-squared 0.3791 0.4025 0.2560 0.3086 0.3161 0.2112
Number of observation 77,731           77,731           77,731           57,547           57,547           57,547          
Table A.7: The Relationship between ECE Designation, ECE Firm Age Interaction and Firm Profitability in the 
Subsample of Firms Whose Size is Above Median Each Year
Dependent Variable
Joint Venture Sample Non-Joint Venture Sample
Note: The dependent variables are the three measures of firm performance as defined in Table 1. A.  Columns 1 through 3 
are regressions for the joint venture sample, and columns 4 through 6 are for the non-joint venture sample. T-statistics 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are below the coefficient estimates.